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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Aaron J. Campbell *
John I. Jones, IV **
Rachel L. Yates ***
INTRODUCTION
This article surveys recent developments in criminal law and
procedure in Virginia. Because of space limitations, the authors
have limited their discussion to the most significant appellate decisions and legislation.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Indictments
In Epps v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether an indictment was invalid when the order memorializing the grand jury’s actions was not entered until after the
trial. 1 The grand jury returned an indictment in open court against
Epps for abduction. 2 Following a bench trial, Epps was convicted
of the charge. 3 After the trial, Epps moved to dismiss his conviction
when he discovered that no order had been entered recording his

* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Office of the Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2009, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2002,
Concord University.
** Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Office of the Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2015, Regent University School of Law; B.S., 2009, Central
Christian College of Kansas.
*** Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Office of the Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2013, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2009,
University of Virginia.
1. 293 Va. 403, 405, 799 S.E.2d 516, 517 (2017).
2. Id. at 405, 799 S.E.2d at 517. The grand jury also returned an indictment for assault
and battery, for which Epps entered a guilty plea. See id. at 405, 799 S.E.2d at 517.
3. Id. at 405, 799 S.E.2d at 517.
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indictment. 4 Thereafter, the trial court entered an order memorializing the grand jury’s actions and denied Epps’ motion to dismiss. 5
Epps argued on appeal that “his conviction must be reversed because no order recording the presentment of the indictment in open
court existed at the time of the trial.” 6 The supreme court observed,
however, that none of the statutes or rules governing indictments
“requires that an order memorializing [the grand jury’s] action[s]
must be entered prior to trial in order for the indictment to be
valid.” 7 The court thus held that the trial court’s delay in entering
the order did not render Epps’ indictment invalid. 8
B. Bail
Duse v. Commonwealth involved the rare reversal by the Supreme Court of Virginia of a trial court’s decision to grant the defendant bail. 9 Duse was charged with first-degree murder, triggering a statutory presumption against bail. 10 The Commonwealth
alleged that Duse, who had recently lost an age discrimination lawsuit against the pharmacy in which he worked, hid behind a dumpster at the rear of the pharmacy and shot the supervisor as the
supervisor was throwing away the store’s trash. 11 In opposing bail,
the Commonwealth presented evidence that Duse had a long history of work grievances and mental health issues, and that “his
current supervisors at the pharmacy . . . feared him ‘a great
deal.’” 12 The trial court nonetheless granted Duse bail identifying
his presumption of innocence, lack of history of violence, and old
age as factors in his favor. 13
The supreme court agreed with all four of the Commonwealth’s
arguments for why the trial court abused its discretion in granting

4. Id. at 405, 799 S.E.2d at 517.
5. Id. at 405–06, 799 S.E.2d at 517.
6. Id. at 407, 799 S.E.2d at 518.
7. See id. at 408, 799 S.E.2d at 518 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-216 to -217 (Repl.
Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:5(c) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
8. Id. at 409, 799 S.E.2d at 519.
9. 295 Va. 1, 1, 809 S.E.2d 513, 514 (2018).
10. Id. at 2, 809 S.E.2d at 514 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
11. Id. at 2, 809 S.E.2d at 515.
12. Id. at 2–3, 809 S.E.2d at 515.
13. Id. at 6–7, 809 S.E.2d at 517.
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Duse bail. 14 First, the court found that the trial court erroneously
utilized the doctrine of presumed innocence, which applies to trials, but not pretrial bail hearings. 15 Second, the court found that
the trial court “gave no meaningful weight” to the nature of the
murder and the seriousness of danger to the public that his release
would pose. 16 Third, the court found that the trial court made a
clear error in judgment when it speculated that Duse would not
abscond due to his old age given that he had a home in the Philippines and had “every incentive, along with the means, to flee prosecution.” 17 Finally, the court held that the trial court made a clear
error in judgment by not considering Duse’s history of mental
health disorders. 18
C. Evidence
In Atkins v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether tweets and text messages recovered from the
defendant’s cell phone were properly admitted into evidence. 19 Atkins was charged with the burglary of three businesses. 20 Police
recovered incriminating tweets and text messages about the stolen
merchandise from Atkins’ cell phone. 21 The tweets and text messages were admitted into evidence over Atkins’ hearsay objection. 22
The issue on appeal was whether the Commonwealth proved
that Atkins was the person who sent the tweet and text messages. 23 In analyzing this issue, the court of appeals observed that
the party admission exception to the hearsay rule requires that the
Commonwealth prove the identity of the speaker and “applies
equally to statements made over the telephone, through text messages, by emails, or using social media such as Twitter.” 24 The
Commonwealth must prove the identity of the person who made

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 7–9, 809 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 7–8, 809 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 8, 809 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 8–9, 809 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 9, 809 S.E.2d at 518.
68 Va. App. 1, 3, 800 S.E.2d 827, 828–29 (2017).
Id. at 3, 800 S.E.2d at 828–29.
Id. at 5–6, 800 S.E.2d at 829–30.
Id. at 6, 800 S.E.2d at 830.
Id. at 6–7, 800 S.E.2d at 830.
Id. at 8, 800 S.E.2d at 831.
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the statement by a preponderance of the evidence. 25 In this case,
Atkins’ cell phone was password protected, a social media app installed on the phone had been created with an email address using
his name, and a photograph in the tweet matched stolen merchandise found in his bedroom. 26 Based on this evidence, the court of
appeals concluded that the Commonwealth proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Atkins was the person who sent the
tweets and text messages from his own phone. 27
In Campos v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
was asked to determine whether a forensic nurse examiner’s testimony relaying her conversation with a child patient was admissible at trial under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay
rule and whether her testimony violated the Confrontation
Clause. 28 The court found that because the child testified at trial,
there was no Sixth Amendment violation as she was subject to
cross-examination. 29 The court then analyzed the medical treatment exception. 30
The court of appeals clarified the distinction between Virginia’s
codified Rules of Evidence and prior existing case law on the issue
of the medical treatment exception. 31 The court explained that
there are two distinct ways to admit such testimony under Virginia
law if sufficiently reliable: (1) for non-hearsay reasons—namely, to
show the basis for a physician’s opinion rather than for the truth
of the matter asserted; and (2) a true hearsay exception pursuant
to Rule of Evidence 2:803(4) for statements made for the purpose
of medical diagnosis or treatment. 32 The court held that the child’s
statements in this case to the forensic nurse examiner, which included the identity of her abuser, were properly admitted under
Rule 2:803(4). 33 The court, however, found that a portion of the
conversation, describing a threat to harm the victim if she told an-

25. Id. at 9, 800 S.E.2d at 831 (citing Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821, 554
S.E.2d 84, 87 (2001)).
26. Id. at 9–10, 800 S.E.2d at 831–32.
27. Id. at 9, 800 S.E.2d at 831.
28. 67 Va. App. 690, 800 S.E.2d 174–75 (2017).
29. Id. at 703, 800 S.E.2d at 181.
30. Id. at 708, 800 S.E.2d at 183.
31. Id. at 711–12, 800 S.E.2d at 185.
32. Id. at 711–12, 800 S.E.2d at 185.
33. Id. at 715–16, 800 S.E.2d at 187.

CAMPBELL 531 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

10/18/2018 9:14 AM

53

yone about what happened, was not admissible under the exception. 34 The court explained that the threat did not relate to medical
diagnosis or treatment, but that the error was harmless under the
facts of the case. 35 The court therefore affirmed appellant’s convictions. 36
In Carter v. Commonwealth, Carter shot and killed his ex-girlfriend following a dispute over a blackmail scheme. 37 At his murder
trial, in support of his self-defense claim, Carter sought to introduce: (1) evidence of a threat against Carter communicated by the
victim to her mother on the day of the shooting, (2) evidence that
the victim had broken her mother’s jaw in 2013, and (3) several
specific instances of the victim’s past violent behavior. 38 The circuit
court excluded the recent threat and the evidence of the victim’s
aggression against her mother, but allowed Carter to testify to the
victim’s prior violent conduct against himself within the two years
preceding the shooting. 39 The two-year limitation allowed Carter
to testify to several incidents involving the victim’s violence, but
prevented Carter from testifying about the victim hitting him in
2008 or 2009 and about her stabbing a man ten years before her
death. 40
The Supreme Court of Virginia assumed without deciding that
the trial court erred in excluding the recent threat evidence, but
held that any such error was harmless in view of the totality of the
evidence. 41 The court found that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion by limiting the time frame of the victim’s prior violent
acts, noting that while the proffered evidence could have been admissible under Rule 2:404, the excluded evidence was “either not
relevant to the time and/or circumstances surrounding the victim’s
death.” 42 The supreme court noted that Carter “knew nothing regarding the circumstances of the victim’s alleged 2013 breaking of
[her mother]’s jaw,” so he could not show how it was “likely to characterize the victim’s conduct toward him”; 43 likewise, the stabbing
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 716, 800 S.E.2d at 187.
Id. at 716–17, 800 S.E.2d at 187–88.
Id. at 718, 800 S.E.2d at 188.
293 Va. 537, 540–42, 800 S.E.2d 498, 499–500 (2017).
Id. at 541 n.2, 542–43, 800 S.E.2d at 500 n.2, 501.
Id. at 541 n.2, 542–43, 800 S.E.2d at 500 n.2, 501.
Id. at 542–43, 800 S.E.2d at 501.
Id. at 544–45, 800 S.E.2d at 502.
See id. at 546–47, 800 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 547, 800 S.E.2d at 503.
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a decade earlier, which had arisen out of the victim’s attempt to
defend her sister, was unrelated to the time or circumstances of
her shooting. 44 The court distinguished Barnes v. Commonwealth
on the basis that the trial court in Barnes excluded all of the proffered evidence of the victim’s prior violence, while in this case,
“Carter was allowed to present most of the evidence he asked to
present regarding the victim’s prior violent conduct.” 45
D. Juror Misconduct
In Bethea v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reviewed an allegation of juror misconduct. 46 On the second day of
jury deliberations of a murder trial, “the judge informed the parties
that a juror told the bailiff ‘through tears that she feels she’s being
bullied.’” 47 Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that “any
verdict would be tainted.” 48 The trial court denied the motion and
“instructed the entire jury on their individual responsibilities to
vote in accordance with their consciences and on its responsibility
as a cohesive body to listen to the opinions and arguments of others
in the group.” 49 The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict, and
each juror confirmed the verdict when they were polled. 50 Defense
counsel asked to question the juror again, but the trial court denied
the request. 51
Virginia protects the secrecy of jury deliberations; therefore, a
juror cannot testify as to what occurred during the course of deliberations. 52 In light of this, the court of appeals held that the trial
court appropriately refused to allow defense counsel to ask the juror a question after the poll. 53 The court further held that the trial

44. Id. at 547, 800 S.E.2d at 503.
45. Compare id. at 547, 800 S.E.2d at 503 (allowing Carter to present evidence regarding victim’s prior violent conduct), with Barnes v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 24, 25, 197 S.E.2d
189, 190 (1973) (excluding evidence of victim’s prior violence).
46. 68 Va. App. 487, 503, 809 S.E.2d 684, 692 (2018).
47. Id. at 503–04, 809 S.E.2d at 692.
48. Id. at 504, 809 S.E.2d at 692.
49. Id. at 508, 809 S.E.2d at 694.
50. Id. at 504–05, 809 S.E.2d at 692.
51. Id. at 505, 809 S.E.2d at 692.
52. See id. at 505–06, 809 S.E.2d at 692–93 (citing VA. R. EVID. 2:606; Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 460, 423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992)).
53. Id. at 506, 809 S.E.2d at 693.
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court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial. 54 The court explained that the juror misconduct “allegation
did not go unchecked or ignored.” 55 The trial court had properly
instructed the jury on their individual and group responsibilities,
which they are presumed to have followed. 56
E. Proffering of Witness Testimony
In Logan v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing
to allow the defendant to proffer additional witness testimony. 57 At
the sentencing hearing, the trial judge told defense counsel that it
would limit the number of defense witnesses to five. 58 Defense
counsel asked for the opportunity to proffer testimony from additional witnesses after the judge retired to chambers. 59 The judge
denied the request. 60
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred when it failed
to allow the defendant the opportunity to proffer his evidence. 61
The court stressed that the trial court had considerable discretion
in limiting the defendant’s number of witnesses at sentencing. 62
However, the trial court could not prevent the defense from making
a record for appellate review. 63 Because the error was not harmless, the court remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. 64
F. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
In Spencer v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
resolved whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his pleas. 65 The grand jury indicted Spencer

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 508, 809 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 508, 809 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 508, 809 S.E.2d at 694.
67 Va. App. 747, 751, 800 S.E.2d 202, 204 (2017).
Id. at 757, 800 S.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 757, 800 S.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 757, 800 S.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 758, 800 S.E.2d at 208.
Id. at 758 n.3, 800 S.E.2d at 208 n.3.
Id. at 758, 800 S.E.2d at 208.
Id. at 759, 800 S.E.2d at 208.
68 Va. App. 183, 185, 806 S.E.2d 410, 411 (2017).
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with child pornography charges based on a search warrant that
uncovered several nude photographs of a sixteen-year-old girl on
his cell phone. 66 Prior to sentencing, Spencer sought to withdraw
his nolo contendere pleas to the charges on the ground that the evidence from the search warrant should have been suppressed. 67
Spencer contended that the search warrant was for a different
phone, but he offered no evidence or testimony in support of this
claim. 68 The trial court denied Spencer’s request to withdraw his
pleas. 69
The court of appeals explained that, in order to withdraw his
pleas, Spencer had to introduce prima facie evidence of a reasonable defense. 70 Spencer, however, did not present any evidence in
support of his “bare assertion” that the search warrant was invalid. 71 The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to
withdraw the pleas, holding that Spencer’s “unsubstantiated contention that the search warrant was ‘for a different phone’” did not
constitute prima facie evidence of a reasonable defense. 72
G. Convictions
In Hackett v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the trial court erred in finding that it lacked
jurisdiction to reduce the defendant’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor. 73 Hackett pled guilty to felony possession with intent to
distribute marijuana. 74 The prosecutor and the defense counsel
had orally agreed that the “appropriate disposition was to ‘take the
case under advisement for an extended period of time, under any
terms and conditions imposed by the court,’ and if the defendant
successfully completed all terms and conditions, the felony charge
would be reduced to a misdemeanor.” 75 The trial court entered the
conviction order on January 20, 2009, and the sentencing order on

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 185, 806 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 186, 806 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 186, 806 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 186, 806 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 188–89, 806 S.E.2d at 412–13.
Id. at 189, 806 S.E.2d at 413.
Id. at 186, 806 S.E.2d at 413.
293 Va. 392, 394–95, 799 S.E.2d 501, 502–03 (2017).
Id. at 395, 799 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 395, 799 S.E.2d at 503.
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April 28, 2009. 76 The trial court never entered any order suspending the conviction or sentencing orders. 77
Several months later, Hackett asked the court to reconsider the
felony conviction. 78 In December of 2009, the trial court ruled that
it would take the motion under advisement. 79 For approximately
five years, the trial court continued the matter. 80 Finally, on December 30, 2014, the trial court denied Hackett’s motion to reduce
the felony to misdemeanor. 81 The trial judge explained that he had
intended to reduce Hackett’s felony to a misdemeanor if he complied with the court’s terms, but the judge had been mistaken that
he had the discretion to reduce the charge. 82
On appeal, the supreme court pointed out that the oral understanding that the trial court would modify the conviction upon
completion of certain conditions was never reduced to writing. 83
Furthermore, the conviction order was never modified, vacated, or
suspended within twenty-one days of its entry. 84 Therefore, the
court held that the trial court had lost jurisdiction by the time
Hackett asked the trial court to modify the conviction. 85
H. Sentences
In Williams v. Commonwealth, the Commonwealth and Williams reached an agreement in which he would be found guilty of
felony assault and battery and not guilty by reason of insanity of
attempted murder. 86 At sentencing, the trial court ordered Williams to serve his incarceration before being involuntarily committed for his mental illness. 87 Williams did not object to the sequencing of his prison sentence and civil commitment. 88 On appeal,

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 395, 799 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 396, 799 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 396, 799 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 396, 799 S.E.2d at 503.
See id. at 396, 799 S.E.2d at 503–04.
Id. at 396, 799 S.E.2d at 504.
Id. at 396–97, 799 S.E.2d at 504.
Id. at 399–400, 799 S.E.2d at 505.
Id. at 400, 799 S.E.2d at 505 (applying VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
Id. at 401, 799 S.E.2d at 506.
294 Va. 25, 25, 810 S.E.2d 885, 886 (2017).
Id. at 26–27, 810 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 27, 810 S.E.2d at 887.
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however, he argued that the trial court erred by sentencing him to
serve the prison term first. 89
Because Williams did not preserve the issue for appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the ends of justice exception to Rule 5:25 applied. 90 The court held that the exception
did not apply because the trial court’s decision to order incarceration before involuntary civil commitment did not result in a grave
injustice. 91 Williams had essentially argued that “imposing his incarceration before his involuntary civil commitment is manifestly
unjust because it deprives him of mental health treatment that he
needs.” 92 The court concluded, however, that Williams would not
be deprived of the mental health treatment he needed while in
prison. 93
I. Appeals
In Cole v. Commonwealth, the Alexandria police arrested Cole
on an outstanding warrant for a drug charge and brought him to
Alexandria Detention Center, where booking authorities performed a routine strip search and discovered that Cole was attempting to smuggle cocaine into the jail. 94 Cole was subsequently
charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 95 The
circuit court granted Cole’s motion to suppress the fruits of the
strip search on the basis that it violated Cole’s Fourth Amendment
rights. 96 On the Commonwealth’s pretrial appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court’s suppression order, and
remanded the matter for trial. 97 Cole was convicted, and he appealed, challenging the court of appeals’ reversal of the suppression order. 98
89. Id. at 27, 810 S.E.2d at 887.
90. Id. at 27–28, 810 S.E.2d at 887.
91. Id. at 28, 810 S.E.2d at 888.
92. Id. at 29, 810 S.E.2d at 888.
93. Id. at 29, 810 S.E.2d at 888–89. Justice Powell, in dissent, would have applied the
ends of justice exception because, in her opinion, the trial court did not follow the statutory
requirements for involuntary civil commitments. See id. at 32–35, 810 S.E.2d at 890–91
(Powell, J., dissenting).
94. 294 Va. 342, 346–47, 806 S.E.2d 387, 390 (2017).
95. Id. at 347, 806 S.E.2d at 390.
96. Id. at 350, 806 S.E.2d at 392.
97. Id. at 350–51, 806 S.E.2d at 392.
98. Id. at 352, 806 S.E.2d at 392. Cole also unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence. See id. at 351, 806 S.E.2d at 392.
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The court of appeals denied Cole’s petition, holding that his attempt to relitigate the suppression issue was precluded by the “law
of the case” doctrine. 99 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the court of appeals erred by finding that its decision in the Commonwealth’s pretrial appeal was preclusive on Cole’s attempt to
raise the issue on his own direct appeal, noting that Virginia Code
section 19.2-409, concerning the finality of a decision in a Commonwealth’s pretrial appeal, provides that a defendant may seek reconsideration of any decision rendered in the pretrial appeal if he
is subsequently convicted. 100 The court went on to find that Cole’s
strip search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. 101
J. Expungement
In A.R.A. v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the trial court erred in declining to expunge a felony arrest record. 102 While in college, the petitioner was arrested
for felony assault and battery of a law enforcement officer after she
“drank to excess.” 103 After the Commonwealth amended the charge
to misdemeanor disorderly conduct, the petitioner pled guilty to
the charge. 104 She went on to graduate from college with honors
and work for “a large media company.” 105 About a year after the
arrest, she sought to expunge the record of her felony arrest. 106 In
denying her request, the trial court focused on the facts surrounding her arrest. 107
The supreme court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition for expungement. 108 The court explained that, since the petitioner’s felony charge had been
amended to a “separate and unrelated” misdemeanor, her felony
arrest qualified as a charge that was “otherwise dismissed” under
the expungement statute. 109 And because the petitioner occupied

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 352, 806 S.E.2d at 392.
Id. at 353, 806 S.E.2d at 393 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-409 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
Id. at 360, 806 S.E.2d at 397.
295 Va. 153, 156, 809 S.E.2d 660, 661 (2018).
Id. at 156, 806 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 156, 806 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 156, 806 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 156, 806 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 157, 809 S.E.2d at 662.
Id. at 163, 809 S.E.2d at 665.
Id. at 158, 809 S.E.2d at 662 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015

CAMPBELL 531 (DO NOT DELETE)

60

10/18/2018 9:14 AM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:49

“‘the status of innocent’ with respect to the original charge,” 110 the
facts of the crime she sought to expunge were irrelevant to the resolution of the expungement petition. 111 The appropriate inquiry “is
forward-looking, rather than backward-looking” and “turns on
whether the continued existence of the record will or may cause the
petitioner a manifest injustice in the future.” 112 Applying this
standard, the court concluded that the trial court gave inappropriate weight to the facts of the alleged crime. 113 The court further
concluded that the petitioner’s circumstances had satisfied the required “manifest injustice” standard because there was a reasonable possibility that a felony arrest record would hinder her career
and educational opportunities. 114
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel, a subset of the Fifth Amendment’s protections against double jeopardy, prevents the relitigation of certain
factual issues decided in previous litigation. 115 To successfully
raise collateral estoppel, a criminal defendant must establish four
elements: (1) that the parties to the two proceedings are the same,
(2) that the factual issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, (3) that the factual issue was essential to the result in the
prior proceeding, and (4) that the prior proceeding resulted in final
judgment against the Commonwealth. 116 The Supreme Court of
Virginia decided two cases in 2017 in which collateral estoppel featured prominently.
In Pijor v. Commonwealth, the defendant claimed that collateral
estoppel barred his prosecution for perjury after his testimony in
& Cum. Supp. 2017)).
110. Id. at 158, 809 S.E.2d at 662 (quoting Dressner v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 1, 7, 736
S.E.2d 735, 738 (2013)).
111. Id. at 159, 809 S.E.2d at 663.
112. Id. at 160, 809 S.E.2d at 663.
113. Id. at 162, 809 S.E.2d at 665.
114. Id. at 163, 809 S.E.2d at 665. The dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that the trial court cannot consider the circumstances of the arrest when a petitioner seeks to expunge an arrest record. See id. at 167–73, 809 S.E.2d at 667–71 (Kelsey,
J., dissenting). The dissent would have found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing the expungement petition. See id. at 172–76, 809 S.E.2d at 670–72.
115. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
116. See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 482, 489, 538 S.E.2d 296, 299 (2000).
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an earlier larceny trial (concerning Pijor’s theft of Ben the dog
(“Ben”) from Pijor’s ex-girlfriend) was shown to be false after his
acquittal. 117 Pijor testified in the larceny trial that he did not take
Ben, and that he had neither seen Ben nor received any information about Ben’s whereabouts since September 6, 2013. 118 Five
days after his acquittal of larceny by a jury (by general verdict),
Pijor was discovered in possession of Ben and charged with perjury. 119 Pijor argued that collateral estoppel precluded relitigating
his (now exposed) role in Ben’s disappearance, because the ultimate issue in both trials was the same: “whether [Pijor] stole the
dog.” 120
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with Pijor’s framing of
the ultimate issues in the respective trials. 121 The ultimate issue
in the larceny trial was whether Pijor took the dog with the intent
to steal him; the ultimate issue in the perjury trial was whether
Pijor willfully lied under oath in his testimony at the larceny
trial. 122 The court emphasized that Pijor had not only testified that
he did not take Ben, but that he had also claimed not to have seen
Ben and to have been ignorant of Ben’s whereabouts. 123 Assuming
the jury credited Pijor’s denial of stealing Ben, as Pijor urged it
had, the jury did not even need to reach Pijor’s denials of having
seen or received information about Ben’s whereabouts. 124 Accordingly, the court held that collateral estoppel did not preclude Pijor’s
prosecution on those latter statements. 125
In Commonwealth v. Leonard, a defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, third or subsequent offense within five
years, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-266. 126 The Commonwealth relied on a 2010 general district court conviction of
DUI, first offense, and a 2012 circuit court conviction of DUI, first
offense, to establish Leonard’s two predicate convictions for the
sentencing enhancement. 127 Leonard noted that before he had
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

294 Va. 502, 505–06, 808 S.E.2d 408, 409–10 (2017).
Id. at 506, 808 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at 506, 510–11, 808 S.E.2d at 410, 412–13.
Id. at 510, 808 S.E.2d at 412.
Id. at 511, 808 S.E.2d at 413.
Id. at 511, 808 S.E.2d at 413.
See id. at 511, 808 S.E.2d at 413.
See id. at 511, 808 S.E.2d at 413.
Id. at 511, 808 S.E.2d at 413.
294 Va. 233, 235, 805 S.E.2d 245, 246 (2017).
Id. at 235–36, 805 S.E.2d 246–47.
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taken and lost his of-right appeal to circuit court in the 2012 case,
the general district court had declined to find him guilty of DUI,
second offense, and had instead convicted him of DUI, first offense,
because the 2010 conviction order did not recite that Leonard had
pled guilty knowingly and voluntarily as required by Boykin v. Alabama. 128 Leonard invoked collateral estoppel, claiming that the
2012 general district court’s ruling barred the Commonwealth
from relitigating the admissibility of the 2010 order for the purposes of sentence enhancement. 129
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Leonard’s theory on the
grounds that the 2012 ruling was a legal determination rather
than a factual matter, and thus determined that collateral estoppel
did not apply. 130 The court noted that “the application of collateral
estoppel in the criminal context has been confined to attempts by
the government to relitigate the facts underlying a prior acquittal.” 131 The only factual issue resolved in the 2012 general district
proceeding was that Leonard was not advised of his rights prior to
entering his guilty plea in the 2010 proceeding. 132 The court emphasized that Leonard had not relied on that fact in the present
proceeding, instead claiming that “the 2010 DUI conviction order
was inadmissible in this case because it was ruled inadmissible in
the 2012 proceeding.” 133 The court held that the 2012 general district court’s admissibility decision “was a determination of law . . .
based on resolution of a factual question that is not at issue in this
case,” and that collateral estoppel thus did not apply to make it
binding in the case at bar. 134 The court noted that the 2010 DUI
conviction remained valid and was admissible for recidivism sentencing enhancement purposes, and that the “double jeopardy concerns arising from attempts by the government to relitigate facts

128. Id. at 236, 805 S.E.2d at 247 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)).
129. Id. at 236–37, 805 S.E.2d at 247.
130. Id. at 240, 805 S.E.2d at 249–50.
131. Id. at 241, 805 S.E.2d at 250.
132. Id. at 240, 805 S.E.2d at 249.
133. Id. at 240, 805 S.E.2d at 249–50. The court observed that Leonard “had no viable
legal ground to collaterally attack the 2010 DUI conviction,” because while Boykin protects
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, “[o]nly convictions obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel are subject to collateral attack in recidivist proceedings.” See
id. at 240 n.10, 805 S.E.2d at 249 n.10.
134. Id. at 241–42, 805 S.E.2d at 250.
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underlying a prior acquittal do not apply to the use of a valid and
existing conviction for enhanced sentencing.” 135
B. Searches
Virginia Code section 19.2-54 requires, among other things, that
magistrates file the affidavit supporting a warrant application
with the circuit court of the jurisdiction where the search is to take
place within seven days after issuing the warrant. 136 The section
further provides that failure to file “shall not invalidate any search
made under the warrant unless such failure shall continue” for
thirty days, and that when the affidavit is filed before the thirtyday period ends, “evidence obtained in any such search shall not
be admissible until a reasonable time after the filing.” 137 Due to a
faxing error, the clerk of court never received a complete affidavit
supporting a search warrant issued for a methamphetamine lab in
Commonwealth v. Campbell, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia
found that this rendered the warrant invalid and the search’s
fruits inadmissible. 138
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the court of appeals’ decision, holding that suppression of evidence obtained in a search
pursuant to a defective warrant is inappropriate where the search
is “justified on grounds other than a warrant.” 139 The court held
that the search of Campbell’s methamphetamine lab was valid under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, expressed no opinion as to whether Virginia Code section
19.2-54 contains an implied suppression remedy, and reinstated
Campbell’s convictions. 140
In Commonwealth v. White, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the Court of Appeals of Virginia’s reversal of a conviction
for possession with intent to distribute heroin. 141 The court of ap-

135. See id. at 241–42, 805 S.E.2d at 250.
136. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 294 Va. 486, 491, 807 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2017) (citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-54) (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-54 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
138. Campbell, 294 Va. at 491–92, 807 S.E.3d at 737–38 (citing Campbell v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 677, 791 S.E.2d 351 (2016)).
139. Id. at 493, 807 S.E.2d at 738.
140. Id. at 493 n.1, 495–97, 807 S.E.2d at 738 n.1, 739–40.
141. 293 Va. 411, 413, 799 S.E.2d 494, 495 (2017).
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peals had held that the trial court erred by denying White’s suppression motion, after finding that White’s girlfriend did not possess apparent authority to give the police consent to search White’s
hotel room. 142 The supreme court reversed, assuming without deciding that the circuit court erred by denying White’s suppression
motion and finding that nevertheless, the evidence from sources
other than the hotel room—including 4.3 grams of undiluted heroin packaged in three different weights, $644 in cash organized by
denominations in different pockets, two cell phones, and a baggie
of marijuana, all found on White’s person—was so overwhelming
that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 143
C. Firearm Offenses
In Gerald v. Commonwealth, Gerald was convicted of discharging a firearm in public, brandishing a firearm, and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, after he fired a “large frame handgun”
several times and threatened a number of witnesses with it. 144 He
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, claiming that because the gun was never found, the Commonwealth had failed to prove that it met the relevant statutory
definitions for “firearm” under Virginia Code sections 18.2-280,
18.2-282, and 18.2-308.2. 145 Virginia Code section 18.2-282(C) contains its own definition of “firearm” “[f]or purposes of this section,” 146 and the definition of “firearm” is well-established for felon
in possession prosecutions under Virginia Code section 18.2308.2. 147 What constitutes a firearm in the context of a prosecution
for discharging a firearm in public in violation of Virginia Code
section 18.2-280, however, came to the Court of Appeals of Virginia
as a matter of first impression. 148
The court of appeals held that the definition of “firearm” contained in Virginia Code section 18.2-282(C) is the proper definition
to use for Virginia Code section 18.2-280. 149 The court further held
142.
(2016).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

White v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 333, 363, 366–67, 785 S.E.2d 239, 254, 256
White, 293 Va. at 419, 423–24, 799 S.E.2d at 498, 500–01.
68 Va. App. 167, 170–71, 805 S.E.2d 407, 409–10 (2017).
Id. at 172–75, 805 S.E.2d at 409–12.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-282(C) (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
See Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 562 S.E.2d 139 (2002).
Gerald, 68 Va. App. at 174, 805 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 175, 805 S.E.2d at 412.
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that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy all of Gerald’s convictions, laying particular emphasis on the testimony regarding Gerald’s actual discharge of the handgun. 150
Virginia Code section 18.2-279 criminalizes several gradations
of discharging a firearm within an occupied building, varying with
the level of mens rea and the result of the discharge. 151 In Bryant
v. Commonwealth, Bryant was indicted under the statute for “unlawfully, but not maliciously,” shooting within an occupied building. 152 She testified in her own defense and denied intentionally
shooting the firearm, but admitted that she had inadvertently
fired. 153 The circuit court refused her proffered jury instruction
which instructed the jury to find her not guilty if it had a reasonable doubt as to whether the discharge was accidental or intentional, and Bryant was convicted. 154
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Bryant’s conviction,
finding that “unlawfully” shooting within an occupied building requires only a showing of criminal negligence. 155 The court explained that even an unintentional shooting, if it resulted from
mishandling of a firearm in a manner that evinced a reckless or
indifferent disregard of the rights of others, would constitute an
“unlawful” shooting in the context of Virginia Code section 18.2279. 156 Accordingly, Bryant’s accident defense was not cognizable,
and she was not entitled to a jury instruction on that theory. 157
Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, is unique: it creates an unclassified felony with a
mandatory minimum sentence without explicitly stating a maximum penalty. 158 In Graves v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court
of Virginia clarified that the mandatory minimum sentence is also
150. Id. at 175–76, 805 S.E.2d at 412. (“[N]o reasonable definition with respect to any of
the offenses here, provides relief for Gerald . . . . Notwithstanding the failure to recover the
weapon, it is difficult to conceive of what more a forensic report from a ballistics examiner
could provide regarding the nature of the object Gerald displayed and discharged as a firearm than the testimony in the record before us supplies.”)
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-279 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2017).
152. 295 Va. 302, 304, 309, 811 S.E.2d 250, 251, 253 (2018) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-279 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2017)).
153. Id. at 305–06, 811 S.E.2d at 251–52.
154. Id. at 307–08, 811 S.E.2d at 252. The jury sentence fixed Bryant’s punishment at a
fine of zero dollars, with no confinement. Id. at 307–08, 811 S.E.2d at 252.
155. Id. at 310–11, 811 S.E.2d at 253–54.
156. Id. at 310–11, 811 S.E.2d at 253–54.
157. Id. at 311, 811 S.E.2d at 254.
158. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
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the maximum. 159 The court noted that Virginia Code section 18.253.1’s lack of both class and maximum punishment language
makes it anomalous among the forty-two statutes in the Virginia
Code prescribing mandatory minimum punishments. 160 The court
resolved this ambiguity by resorting to legislative history, holding
that the General Assembly did not intend to increase the offense’s
penalty when it amended it in 2004 as part of a broader effort at
standardizing mandatory minimum language throughout the Virginia Code. 161 Because the maximum penalty was three years,
Graves’s original sentence of five years with two years suspended
was accordingly invalid and the court granted Graves’s motion to
vacate his sentence. 162 The court rejected Graves’s request for a
new sentencing hearing and instead remanded the case for entry
of a new sentencing order in conformity with its ruling because a
three-year sentence was the only sentence available. 163
D. Property Crimes
In Commonwealth v. Moseley, Moseley was convicted of two
counts of burglary and two counts of larceny, based on an entirely
circumstantial body of evidence. 164 Moseley had been seen driving
away from the vicinity of a burglarized house, and another burglary had occurred nearby two weeks later. 165 Moseley was detained in the vicinity of a third aborted burglary near the second
burgled home, on the same day as the second home was burglarized, with heavy knit gloves in his pocket on a warm June day. 166
While Moseley was detained, a car that he used but did not own
was towed from an apartment complex with its windows down and
its keys in the ignition; the center console of the car contained property that had been taken in the two burglaries, mixed together

159. See 294 Va. 196, 200, 805 S.E.2d 226, 227 (2017).
160. Id. at 200–01, 805 S.E.2d at 227–28.
161. Id. at 202–04, 805 S.E.2d at 230; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-12.1 (Repl. Vol.
2014) (creating one definition for “mandatory minimum” sentences).
162. Graves, 294 Va. at 198, 805 S.E.2d at 227.
163. Id. at 198–99, 805 S.E.2d at 227. Justice Kelsey wrote a dissent, stating that he is
unwilling to find that the minimum punishment must equal the maximum punishment in
a case where the legislature declined to state a maximum. Id. at 209, 805 S.E.2d at 232–33
(Kelsey, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that in the absence of an explicit statutory maximum penalty, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. Id. at 222, 805 S.E.2d at 234.
164. 293 Va. 455, 458, 464, 799 S.E.2d 683, 684, 687 (2017).
165. Id. at 458–60, 799 S.E.2d at 684–85.
166. Id. at 459–60, 799 S.E.2d at 684–85.
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with Moseley’s identification card and library card. 167 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia reversed Moseley’s convictions after concluding
that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Moseley had
exclusive dominion and control over the stolen property. 168
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and reinstated Moseley’s convictions, finding that the court of appeals had made a
“fragmented assessment of the record” and “improperly scrutinized
each piece of evidence in isolation,” rather than viewing the evidence in its totality, and that it had moreover failed to give proper
deference to the factfinder. 169 The court reaffirmed the strong deference given to a factfinder’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence
and its determination of whether a hypothesis of innocence is reasonable, as laid out in Commonwealth v. Hudson. 170 The court held
that “a rational factfinder could . . . find that the totality of the suspicious circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Moseley” committed all four crimes. 171
The issue decided by the court of appeals in Lee v. Commonwealth was whether a screwdriver may be a deadly weapon for sentencing enhancement purposes for breaking and entering in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-91. 172 Lee conceded the evidence
was sufficient for breaking and entering in the daytime when he
used his screwdriver to pry open a basement window. 173 After Lee
entered the home, he encountered the victim and held the screwdriver to her neck and demanded money. 174 Lee argued that because the breaking and entering was already complete when he
used the screwdriver against the victim, it was not a “deadly
weapon” within the meaning of the statute. 175

167. Id. at 459–61, 799 S.E.2d at 685.
168. Moseley v. Commonwealth, No. 0881-15-1, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 182, at *16 (June
7, 2016) (unpublished decision).
169. Moseley, 293 Va. at 466, 799 S.E.2d at 688.
170. Id. at 464–65, 799 S.E.2d at 687 (citing Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505,
514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003)).
171. Id. at 466, 799 S.E.2d at 688. Justice Goodwyn dissented, opining that because the
larceny and related burglary inferences did not apply in this case, the evidence did not reach
the necessary threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, even viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth. Id. at 466–68, 799 S.E.2d at 688–89 (Goodwyn, J., dissenting).
172. 68 Va. App. 313, 315–16, 808 S.E.2d 224, 225–26 (2017).
173. Id. at 316–17, 808 S.E.2d at 226–27.
174. Id. at 316, 808 S.E.2d at 226.
175. Id. at 317, 808 S.E.2d at 227.
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The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s determination to
classify the screwdriver as a deadly weapon. 176 The court found
that the legislature intended to protect occupants by discouraging
burglars from carrying deadly weapons. 177 Therefore, the manner
of an object’s use inside the dwelling is relevant to prove the material issue of whether the burglar intended to use an object as a
weapon and whether it could be deadly. 178 The court also held that
what the burglar contemplated or intended was relevant in categorizing an object as a deadly weapon. 179 The court determined that
the screwdriver was used for the dual purpose of a burglarious tool
and a weapon as the evidence showed that Lee knew someone was
home, kept the screwdriver in his hand for ready use and did not
abandon it, and made statements indicating his intent. 180 The
court accordingly affirmed the conviction. 181
E. Displaying a Noose
Virginia Code section 18.2-423.2(B) prohibits displaying a noose
in a “public place” with intent to intimidate. 182 In Turner v. Commonwealth, Turner was convicted of violating this statute after he
displayed a noose in his front yard, visible from a public road, from
which he hung a black, life-size mannequin. 183 Turner claimed that
because the noose was on his private property, it was not located
in a public place as required by the statute. 184
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, distinguishing between concepts of “public place” and “public property,” and contrasting the General Assembly’s use of “public place” with its use
of “private property” in subsection (A) of the same statute. 185 The
court applied the definition of “public place” adopted in Hackney v.
Commonwealth which includes “private property generally visible
by the public from some other location.” 186 Because Turner’s noose

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 320, 808 S.E.2d at 228.
Id. at 319, 808 S.E.2d at 227.
Id. at 319, 808 S.E.2d at 227.
Id. at 319, 808 S.E.2d at 228.
Id. at 320, 808 S.E.2d at 228.
Id. at 320, 808 S.E.2d at 228.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
295 Va. 104, 107, 809 S.E.2d 679, 680 (2018).
Id. at 108, 809 S.E.2d at 681.
Id. at 110, 809 S.E.2d at 682–84.
Id. at 113, 809 S.E.2d at 683–84 (quoting Hackney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888,
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display undisputedly fell within this definition, the court affirmed
his conviction. 187
F. Sex Crimes Against Minors
Virginia Code section 18.2-374.3(B) proscribes using a cell phone
for “purposes of procuring or promoting the use of a minor” in conduct that would violate the indecent liberties statute, Virginia
Code section 18.2-370 or 18.2-374.1. 188 In Dietz v. Commonwealth,
a teacher was convicted of violating this provision after she engaged in a lengthy sexualized text and photo conversation with a
detective who was responding as her eleven-year-old student by
using the student’s cell phone. 189 Dietz sent photos of a portion of
her breasts, her legs, her face, and her lips, all taken while she was
lying in a bathtub. 190 Dietz claimed on appeal that Virginia Code
section 18.2-374.3(B) did not prohibit communications with the minor himself, but that it rather criminalized communications with
a third party to solicit a minor. 191 Dietz also claimed that the photo
of her breasts did not constitute exposure of a “sexual part” within
the meaning of Virginia Code section 18.2-370(A)(1), and that a
completed offense under that section was required to prove a violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-374.3(B). 192
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected both of Dietz’s arguments. 193 The court declined to read a third-party requirement into
Virginia Code section 18.2-374.3(B), noting the lack of an explicit
provision and the fact that the plain language of the statute could
be satisfied by communication with a minor or a third party. 194 The
court did not reach whether the photo of Dietz’s breasts were a
“sexual part” sufficient to support a completed violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-370(A)(1). 195 The court clarified that the Commonwealth need not establish a completed violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-370 to show a violation of section 18.2-374.3(B),
891–93, 45 S.E.2d 241, 242–43 (1947)).
187. Id. at 113, 809 S.E.2d at 684.
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
189. 294 Va. 123, 127–29, 804 S.E.2d 309, 311–12 (2017).
190. Id. at 127, 804 S.E.2d at 311.
191. Id. at 133, 804 S.E.2d at 314.
192. Id. at 130, 134, 804 S.E.2d at 312, 314–15.
193. Id. at 134, 136–37, 804 S.E.2d at 314, 316.
194. Id. at 133–34, 804 S.E.2d at 314.
195. Id. at 134, 804 S.E.2d at 314–15.
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and held that given Dietz’s express lascivious intent toward the
victim, the factfinder could have concluded that Dietz had used the
cell phone with the intent to “procure or promote the use of” the
victim for a future violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-370. 196
The court also found that the factfinder could have also concluded
that Dietz’s communications constituted a completed violation of
Virginia Code section 18.2-370(A)(5), which prohibits enticing a
minor to enter any place for the purposes of committing any of the
foregoing subdivisions of subsection (A), where Dietz had asked the
victim where they could be alone so that she could kiss him, and
had stated she would do “[s]o many dirty things” with the victim if
they were alone. 197
G. Felony Child Neglect and Endangerment
Virginia Code section 18.2-371.1(A) prohibits a child’s caregivers
from making willful acts or omissions that result in serious injury
or death to the child. 198 In White v. Commonwealth, a mother was
convicted of violating the statute after her five-year-old son’s body
was found in a septic tank with an unsecured lid, after White had
left him to play unattended. 199
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the conviction, finding
that no evidence in the record supported a finding of fact that
White knew that the septic tank lid was unsecured. 200 The court
reasoned that mere proof that the lid was unsecured was insufficient to establish that the child’s death resulted from White’s willful act or omission. 201 To support the conviction, the evidence had
to establish that White actually knew about the lid and the danger
that it presented for her failure to act to be willful. 202 The evidence
did not establish that White knew about the danger posed by the
unsecured lid, so her failure to remedy it was not willful. 203

196. Id. at 134–37, 804 S.E.2d at 314–16.
197. Id. at 137, 804 S.E.2d at 316 (alteration in original).
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
199. 68 Va. App. 111, 114–15, 804 S.E.2d 317, 318–19 (2017).
200. Id. at 123–27, 804 S.E.2d at 322–24.
201. Id. at 123, 126, 804 S.E.2d at 323.
202. Id. at 123–25, 804 S.E.2d at 322–24.
203. Id. at 125–27, 804 S.E.2d at 323–24. Judge Alston dissented, opining that the totality of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, could have
supported a reasonable factfinder in concluding “that the totality of [White]’s actions and
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In Hannon v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined that the evidence was insufficient to sustain appellant’s convictions for felony child endangerment in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-371.1(B)(1). 204 The evidence established
that a five-year-old boy and four-month-old girl were sitting in a
car with unlocked doors in the parking lot of a Dollar General for
approximately fifteen minutes. 205 The trial court found that, left
alone, both children were at risk of substantial injury or death despite the defense argument that Hannon did not act with a reckless
disregard for human life. 206
The court of appeals, however, found that although there are a
variety of possible ways a child could suffer injury in the circumstances presented, “even the aggregation of those possibilities does
not result in a situation where the children were likely to suffer
injury.” 207 Accordingly, the court reversed Hannon’s conviction. 208
H. Murder and Crimes of Violence
In Howsare v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
determined whether the trial court erred in admitting the prosecution’s proposed jury instruction because it omitted an otherwise
correct statement of law. 209 Over the defense’s objection, the jury
was instructed that it could infer intent for a murder conviction
from the defendant’s acts and conduct instead of “acts, conducts,
and statements.” 210 On appeal, Howsare argued that the statement
of law was incomplete and therefore misleading, even though a
separate instruction was given that informed the jury that it could
take into account the defendant’s statements. 211
In rejecting Howsare’s argument, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reaffirmed the principle that “[w]here other [jury] instructions
fully and fairly cover the principles of law governing the case, the
trial court does not err in refusing an additional instruction on the
omissions ultimately led to [her son]’s death; which is all that the Commonwealth was required to prove.” Id. at 127–30, 804 S.E.2d at 325–26 (Alston, J., dissenting).
204. 68 Va. App. 87, 90, 803 S.E.2d 355, 356 (2017).
205. Id. at 90, 803 S.E.2d at 356–57.
206. Id. at 91, 803 S.E.2d at 357.
207. Id. at 96, 803 S.E.2d at 359.
208. Id. at 96, S.E.2d at 359.
209. 293 Va. 439, 442–43, 799 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2017).
210. Id. at 442–43, 799 S.E.2d at 514–15.
211. Id. at 442–43, 799 S.E.2d at 514–15.
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same subject.” 212 Moreover, because the instructions are to be reviewed as a whole rather than in isolation, the court found that the
jury had been properly instructed. 213 The court further rejected
Howsare’s argument that an instruction is inadmissible simply because it deviates from the Model Jury Instructions. 214
In Edwards v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the prosecution proved venue in a murder case
by relying exclusively on circumstantial evidence. 215 The victim
was last seen in Chesterfield County at her home and Edwards was
found to be nearby the victim’s home when the offense occurred. 216
A witness testified that screams were heard coming from the victim’s residence. 217 Edwards’s car had blood stains in the trunk with
hair that matched the victim’s hair color. 218 The defense made a
motion to dismiss for improper venue, arguing that venue was not
properly established. 219
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that Virginia Code section
14.2-248 was the applicable statute, which provides that “if a mortal wound, or other violence or injury, be inflicted . . . and death
ensues therefrom in another county or city, the offense may be
prosecuted in either.” 220 The court reasoned that the circumstantial evidence in the case established a “strong inference” that Edwards went into the victim’s home in Chesterfield County for several hours and either mortally wounded or murdered her there,
and then later disposed of her body. 221 The court noted, however,
that any violence in a particular locality, “no matter how minor,”
could be sufficient to establish venue under Virginia Code section
19.2-248. 222 The court additionally rejected a sufficiency argument
and affirmed the judgment. 223

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 443, 799 S.E.2d at 515.
Id. at 445, 799 S.E.2d at 515.
Id. at 444, 799 S.E.2d at 515.
68 Va. App. 284, 294–95, 808 S.E.2d 211, 215–16 (2017).
Id. at 290–91, 808 S.E.2d 213–14.
Id. at 295, 808 S.E.2d at 216.
Id. at 295, 808 S.E.2d at 216.
Id. at 294, 808 S.E.2d at 215.
Id. at 294, 808 S.E.2d at 216 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-248 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
Id. at 296, 808 S.E.2d at 216.
Id. at 296 n.3, 808 S.E.2d at 216 n.3.
Id. at 304, 808 S.E.2d at 220.
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In Commonwealth v. Gregg, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that Gregg’s conviction for common law involuntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter per Virginia Code section
18.2-154 (malicious shooting at an occupied vehicle) violated the
Double Jeopardy clause. 224 Gregg argued that the Double Jeopardy
Clause foreclosed his second conviction because Virginia Code section 18.2-154 provides that a person so convicted “is guilty of involuntary manslaughter.” 225 The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed Gregg’s conviction, holding that Gregg could not be
convicted of both charges. 226
The supreme court began its analysis by noting that if the legislature expressly declares its intent to inflict multiple punishments
for the same conduct, the courts must respect its intent to do so. 227
The court found that the General Assembly did not draw a distinction between species of involuntary manslaughter and did not specify, as it did in some other statutes, that a violation of that section
does not preclude the applicability of other criminal statutes. 228
The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to permit
simultaneous punishment for both involuntary manslaughter and
manslaughter per Virginia Code section 18.2-154. 229 The court
then remanded for the Commonwealth to elect between the sentences for which conviction to vacate. 230
In Burrous v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
found that the evidence was sufficient to support Burrous’s robbery
conviction. 231 The police recovered a bandana containing DNA evidence matching the defendant’s profile. 232 The victims identified
the bandana as the one worn by the robber. 233 Burrous also had
photos on Facebook with him wearing a similar bandana. 234 The

224. 295 Va. 293, 300–01, 811 S.E.2d 258–59 (2018).
225. Id. at 296, 300, 811 S.E.2d at 256, 258 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-154 (Cum.
Supp. 2017)).
226. Gregg v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 375, 387–88, 796 S.E.2d 447, 454 (2017).
227. Gregg, 295 Va. at 298, 811 S.E.2d. at 257.
228. Id. at 299–301, 811 S.E.2d at 258.
229. Id. at 301, 811 S.E.2d at 259.
230. Id. at 301, 811 S.E.2d at 259.
231. 68 Va. App. 275, 808 S.E.2d 206, 207 (2017).
232. Id. at 277, 808 S.E.2d at 207–08.
233. Id. at 278–79, 808 S.E.2d at 208.
234. Id. at 278, 808 S.E.2d at 208.
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defense argued there was insufficient evidence of the identity of
the perpetrator. 235
Burrous argued his case was controlled by Jennings v. Commonwealth, in which the court found there was insufficient evidence to
prove identity where the evidence was limited to DNA evidence,
because the defendant matched one of several DNA profiles recovered. 236 The court determined that Jennings did not control because Burrous was the only DNA profile found and the bandana
was recovered by a police dog tracking the scent of the assailant. 237
The court further noted that in the present case, there were other
circumstances which negated the possibility that someone could
have innocently come into contact with the bandana at another
time. 238 Accordingly, the court affirmed Burrous’s conviction. 239
I. Implied Consent
In Shin v. Commonwealth, the defense appealed the trial court’s
ruling that Shin unreasonably refused to submit to a breath test in
violation of Virginia’s implied consent laws. 240 First, Shin argued
his refusal was reasonable because the implied consent law violated the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” in that it required
him to waive his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches as a condition of his driving privilege. 241 The Supreme
Court of Virginia disagreed, relying on Birchfield v. North Dakota,
to find that warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk
driving do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 242 Because Shin was
only required to give a blood test if he did not submit to a breath
test, the court did not reach the question of whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies to the portion of the statutes
concerning blood samples. 243

235. Id. at 279, 808 S.E.2d at 208.
236. Id. at 280, 808 S.E.2d at 209 (citing Jennings v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 620,
628, 798 S.E.2d 828, 832 (2017)).
237. Id. at 281, 808 S.E. 2d at 209.
238. Id. at 283, 808 S.E.2d at 210.
239. Id. at 283, 808 S.E.2d at 210.
240. 294 Va. 517, 808 S.E.2d 401, 402 (2017).
241. Id. at 520, 808 S.E.2d at 402.
242. Id. at 524, 808 S.E.2d at 404 (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, __, 136
S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016)).
243. Id. at 525, 808 S.E.2d at 405.
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Shin also argued Virginia Code section 18.2-268.3 was unconstitutionally vague in not providing when refusal is reasonable. 244
Shin asserted that the determination of reasonableness is entirely
subjective, leading to arbitrary enforcement. 245 The supreme court
found Shin lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute because he could not show that his refusal, which he asserted was because “he did not believe he was intoxicated and
should not have been subjected to such tests,” was reasonable. 246
Finally, Shin argued that Virginia’s implied consent law violates
article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution, which provides that
no individual “shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to give
evidence against himself.” 247 Shin argued that requiring samples
to be provided would constitute providing evidence against himself. 248 The court found that breath tests, like blood tests, are not
testimonial because they do not communicate anything related to
an individual’s thoughts or motivations and thus do not implicate
the protections encompassed by Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia
Constitution. 249
J. Driving Privileges
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held in Grasty v. Commonwealth that if a commercial fisherman’s license is suspended pursuant to Virginia Code section 46.2-301(B), they are prohibited
from operating any motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth, even if they are otherwise exempt from the requirement to
obtain a driver’s license. 250 Grasty argued that if he never needed
a license to begin with pursuant to Virginia Code sections 46.2-300,
46.2-303, and 46.2-674, then the trial court erred in finding him
guilty of operating a motor vehicle on a suspended or revoked license. 251

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 525, 808 S.E.2d at 405.
Id. at 525, 808 S.E.2d at 405.
Id. at 527, 808 S.E.2d at 406.
Id. at 527–28, 808 S.E.2d at 406 (citing VA. CONST. art. I, § 8).
Id. at 528, 808 S.E.2d at 406.
Id. at 530, 808 S.E.2d at 407.
68 Va. App. 232, 807 S.E.2d 238, 242 (2017).
Id. at 236, 807 S.E.2d at 240.
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The court of appeals held that Triplett v. Commonwealth controlled. 252 There, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that habitual
offenders were prohibited from driving motor vehicles even if the
vehicle was a farm-use vehicle and otherwise did not require a
driver’s license. 253 The court followed the Triplett court’s reasoning
and held that legislative intent plainly expressed that the privilege
to drive can be revoked or suspended and that an exception to the
licensing requirement was not legislative immunity from “all consequences of violating the rules of the road.” 254
III. LEGISLATION
A. Animal Abandonment
The General Assembly lowered from five days to four days the
amount of time for which failing to provide the elements of basic
care constitutes the crime of abandonment of an animal. 255 The
General Assembly also increased the penalty for abandonment of
an animal from a Class 3 misdemeanor to a Class 1 misdemeanor
penalty. 256
B. Cell Phone Service Expiration After Protective Order
The General Assembly passed legislation providing that a petitioner of a protective order or family or household member in a
family abuse case may be granted exclusive use and possession of
a cellular telephone number or electronic device. 257 It additionally
allows the court to enjoin a respondent from terminating a cellular
telephone number or contract with a third-party provider. 258 The

252. Id. at 238, 807 S.E.2d at 241 (citing Triplett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 649, 186
S.E.2d 16 (1972)).
253. Triplett, 212 Va. at 651–52, 186 S.E.2d at 17–18.
254. Grasty, 68 Va. App. at 240, 807 S.E.2d at 242.
255. Act of Mar. 23, 2018, ch. 416, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 3.2-6500, -6504 (Cum. Supp. 2018); id. §§ 18.2-403.1, -403.2 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
256. Id. ch. 416, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
257. Act of Feb. 26, 2018, ch. 38, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.1-253.1, -279.1 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
258. Id. ch. 38, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
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court may also enjoin the respondent from using location service
tracking to locate the petitioner. 259
C. Discovery
Criminal history record information may only be disseminated
to enumerated entities as provided in Virginia Code section 19.2389. Under new legislation, this criminal history record information may now be disseminated in response to a discovery request, or more generally for a court’s review. 260
D. Drones
The General Assembly created two new Virginia Code sections
that criminalize certain use of drones. 261 Under section 18.2-121.3,
it is a Class 1 misdemeanor for a person to “knowingly and intentionally cause[] an unmanned aircraft system to enter the property
of another and come within 50 feet of a dwelling house (i) to coerce,
intimidate, or harass another person or (ii) after having been given
actual notice to desist.” 262 The section does not apply if the person
has consent or is authorized by federal regulation to operate the
drone. 263
Section 18.2-324.2 prohibits certain uses of drones by sex offenders and respondents of protective orders. 264 Registered sex offenders cannot use a drone to follow or contact someone without permission; or to capture recognizable images of a person without
permission. 265 Respondents of a protective order cannot use a
drone to follow, contact, or capture images of the petitioner or persons named in the protective order. 266 A violation of these provisions is a Class 1 misdemeanor. 267

259. Id. ch. 38, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
260. Act of Feb. 26, 2018, ch. 49, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-389 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
261. Act of May 18, 2018, ch. 851, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-926.3 (Repl. Vol. 2018); codified at id. §§ 18.2-121.3, -324.2 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
262. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-121.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
263. Id. § 18.2-121.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
264. Id. § 18.2-324.2 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. § 18.2-324.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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E. Female Genital Mutilation
Previously, violating Virginia’s prohibition against female genital mutilation constituted a Class 1 misdemeanor. The General Assembly increased the gradation of this offense to a Class 2 felony. 268
F. Larceny Threshold
The General Assembly raised the value threshold for felony larceny, as well as a host of other property crimes containing similar
thresholds, from $200 to $500. 269
G. Presumption Against Bail
The General Assembly added several human trafficking offenses
to the list of crimes for which there is a presumption against bail. 270
The list includes: (1) taking or detaining a person for the purposes
of prostitution or unlawful sexual intercourse, (2) receiving money
from procuring or placing a person in a house of prostitution or
forced labor, (3) receiving money from the earnings of a prostitute,
and (4) commercial sex trafficking. 271
H. Restitution
Virginia’s restitution system received three significant alterations. First, a system was created to identify and locate crime victims to whom restitution is still owed, and to distribute collected
but unclaimed restitution payments to them. 272 Second, new procedures were established enabling courts to monitor defendants’
compliance with restitution orders. 273 Finally, the General Assembly exempted restitution orders docketed as civil judgments under
268. Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 549, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-51.7 (Cum. Supp. 2018); id. § 19.2-8 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
269. Act of Apr. 4, 2018, ch. 764, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended in scattered
sections of VA. CODE ANN. tit. 18.2 (Cum. Supp. 2018); codified as amended at id. § 29.1-553
(Cum. Supp. 2018)).
270. Act of Mar. 2, 2018, ch. 71, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-120 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
271. Id. ch. 71, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
272. Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 724, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.2-305.1, -349, -368.3 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
273. Act of Mar. 19, 2018, ch. 316, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 9.1-176.1, -305.1, -358, -368.15 (Cum. Supp. 2018); id. § 53.1-145 (Cum. Supp.
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Virginia Code section 8.01-446, pursuant to Virginia Code section
19.2-305.2(B), from any statute of limitations. 274
I. Sentence Reduction for Substantial Assistance to the
Prosecution
Under new legislation, a trial court may reduce a convicted individual’s sentence after final judgment if such person provides “substantial assistance” in the furtherance of an investigation of another person engaged in an act of violence or for offenses involving
the manufacture or distribution of controlled substances or marijuana. 275 Only the Commonwealth’s Attorneys may move for the
sentence reduction. 276 In determining whether the defendant provided “substantial assistance,” the court shall consider an enumerated list of circumstances. 277 In addition, depending on the circumstances, the court may or may not be able to reduce the sentence if
the motion is made more than one year after entry of the final judgment order. 278
J. THC-A Oil/Cannabidiol Oil
New legislation provides that a medical practitioner may issue
a written certification for the use of cannabidiol (“CBD”) oil or
THC-A oil for the treatment or to alleviate the symptoms of any
diagnosed “condition or disease” determined by the practitioner. 279
This expands the ability of medical practitioners to prescribe these
oils for use beyond intractable epilepsy, which was the only use
allowable under prior law. 280 The legislation also provides for a
ninety-day supply when previously only thirty-day supplies were
authorized. 281

2018)).
274. Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 736, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.2-305.2, -341 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
275. Act of Mar. 29, 2018, ch. 492, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2303.01 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
276. Id. ch. 492, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
277. Id. ch. 492, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
278. Id. ch. 492, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
279. Act of Mar. 9, 2018, ch. 246, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-250.1 (Cum. Supp. 2018); id. §§ 54.1-3408.3, -3442.5, -3442.7 (Cum. Supp.
2018)).
280. Id. ch. 246, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
281. Id. ch. 246, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
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K. Timeliness of Indictments
The legislature passed a new law to clarify a pre-existing requirement that a person in jail on a criminal charge is to be discharged from jail if an indictment, presentment, or information is
not found or filed against him before the end of the second term of
court at which he is held to answer. 282 The bill elaborates that this
only applies when a charge has been certified or otherwise transferred from a district court to circuit court. 283
L. Weekend Jail Time
New legislation allows courts to impose nonconsecutive or weekend jail time for defendants convicted of a misdemeanor, traffic offense, any offense under chapter 5 of title 20, or a non-violent felony if there are forty-five days or less to serve. 284 Courts must find
“good cause” and may only impose a nonconsecutive sentence if the
Commonwealth does not object. 285

282. Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 551, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-242 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
283. Id. ch. 551, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
284. Act of Mar. 29, 2018, ch. 535, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 53.1-131.1 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
285. Id. ch. 535, 2018 Va. Acts at __.

